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Note
An Unconstitutional Work of Art: Discussing
Where the Federal Governments Discrete
Intrusions Into Ones Privacy Become an
Unconstitutional Search Through Mosaic Theory
Steven Graziano*
Modern technology has brought new challenges to notions
of privacy, both practically and legally. Governmental abilities
to surveil individuals, as well as the ability of citizens to
seemingly carry around their entire lives in their electronic
devices, has made the risk of egregious governmental intrusion
into privacy a serious concern. Following the disclosures from
Edward Snowden in the summer of 2013, the American public
became far more aware, and arguably less approving, of the
surveillance the government conducts.1 The National Security
Agencys (NSA) metadata collection program received extra
© 2016 Steven Graziano
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Minnesota Law School. The
author would like to thank all the staff members and editors of the Minnesota
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thank Professor William McGeveran for guidance and support throughout the
entire note-writing process. Special thanks to Professor Deven Desai for the
unexpected, yet greatly appreciated, assistance. Additionally, the author
would like to thank Edward Snowden for, at the very least, sparking a much
needed policy discussion within our nation.
1. See George Gao, What Americans Think About NSA Surveillance,
National Security and Privacy, PEW RES. (May 29, 2015),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/29/what-americans-think-
about-nsa-surveillance-national-security-and-privacy (showing a majority of
Americans disapprove of the governments collection of phone and internet
data as part of anti-terrorism efforts); Brett LoGiurato, Edward Snowdens
Leaks Have Caused a Massive Shift in the Publics Views of Government
Surveillance, BUS. INSIDER (July 10, 2013, 8:41 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/edward-snowden-poll-nsa-surveillance-
asylum-venezuela-2013-7 (noting a shift in public opinion toward believing
that government surveillance methods go too far in restricting civil
liberties).
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attention because of the volume of information it collects.2 The
metadata collection program was enjoined for a time by a
federal district court judge who ruled the program likely to be
unconstitutional,3 and Congress responded by altering some of
the NSAs powers with the USA FREEDOM Act (Freedom Act)
in the summer of 2015.4 However, the legal doctrine that
allowed for its initial creation, and continued usethe third-
party doctrineis still alive in American courts.
The third-party doctrine states that an individual has no
legitimate or reasonable expectation of privacy in information
freely shared with a third-party, and thus government
collection of that information is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 While the
origins of this doctrine seem largely reasonable, technological
advances create new issues in its implementation.6 All the
information now turned over to third-parties, while seemingly
insignificant individually, offers vast insight into the private
2. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions
of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-
court-order ([C]ommunication records of millions of US citizens are being
collected indiscriminately and in bulk  regardless of whether they are
suspected of any wrongdoing.); Chandra Steele, 7 Chilling Ways the NSA Can
Spy on You, PC MAG. (Jan. 15, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2
/0,2817,2429502,00.asp (describing backdoor access methods built into
hardware and software the NSA is reported to use to monitor activity).
3. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2942 (D.D.C. 2013)
(granting an injunction against Government collection of any telephony
metadata associated with Verizon accounts), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d
559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
4. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414, 18 U.S.C.A. 22802281, 2332(i),
2709, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 18411843, 18611862, 18711874, 1881a (West 2015));
see Bill Chappell, Senate Approves USA Freedom Act, Obama Signs It, After
Amendments Fail, NATL PUB. RADIO (June 2, 2015, 9:48 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/06/02/411534447/senateis-
poised-to-vote-on-house-approved-usa-freedom-act.
5. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 74344 (1979) (This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.).
6. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) ([I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age . . . .
(citations omitted)).
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life of an individual when pieced together.7 In response,
scholars crafted mosaic theory, which posits that at some point
these discrete intrusions into ones privacy become a search,
which triggers constitutional protections and therefore requires
probable cause and a warrant.8 Although a valiant attempt at
redefining third-party doctrine for the modern age, mosaic
theory also has its shortcomings. First, at what point does a
collection of small intrusions into privacy become a search?9
Second, how can non-searches ever become a search?10
This Note will discuss how a collection of isolated
intrusions constitute a search carried out by government
surveillance programs. The first part of this Note discusses the
history, role, and power of the NSA. It also discusses Edward
Snowden and his effect on the debate surrounding the NSAs
use of mass surveillance. Part II discusses legal issues
surrounding surveillance. Specifically, Part II analyzes recent
challenges to the NSAs programs, highlighting the different
approaches taken by different courts. Part II also illustrates
third-party doctrine and the emergence of mosaic theory as a
means to adapt third-party doctrine for modern purposes. This
part concludes by presenting critiques of mosaic theory. Part
III responds to critiques of mosaic theory by determining a
point where a large number of discrete, presumably
constitutional, intrusions into ones privacy transform into an
unconstitutional, warrantless search. This Note attempts to
provide the legal community with reasoned guidance on the
7. See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 56263 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (discussing how discrete pieces of information retrieved from a GPS
tracking device can offer insight into the subjects habits), affd in part sub
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
8. See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311, 320 (2012) (The mosaic theory requires courts to apply the
Fourth Amendment search doctrine to government conduct as a collective
whole rather than in isolated steps. . . . [T]he mosaic theory asks whether a
series of acts that are not searches in isolation amount to a search when
considered as a group.).
9. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954 (questioning how a court can determine
the line where non-searches can become a search). See generally Mike
Gentithes, When the Government Mines Big Data, Does It Conduct a Fourth
Amendment Search?, CBA REC., Jan. 2015, at 36, 3637 (At some unknown
point . . . constant and ubiquitous monitoring infringes upon privacy in a way
that individual instances of the same monitoring do not.).
10. See generally Gentithes, supra note 9, at 37 (Critics might also point
out a glaring logical inconsistency in mosaic theory. It seems impossible that
some quantity of non-searches can somehow equal a search.).
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implementation of mosaic theory, which preserves both the
governments power to conduct intelligence gathering activities,
and the peoples right to be safe from unreasonable searches in
the context of modern technology.
I. NSA HISTORY
A. NSA CREATION
To address Americas national security needs after World
War II, the United States Government took many steps to
increase not only its military, but also its intelligence
capabilities.11 The NSA was founded by President Harry S.
Truman in 1952 against the backdrop of the Korean War to
consolidate intelligence gathering functions from various
branches of the military and civilian law enforcement
agencies.12 President Truman discretely created the agency in a
memorandum adopted substantially from a report by two
consultants from the civilian intelligence community.13 Due to
its role as an intelligence collection operation, the government
kept the NSA confidential and the public did not become aware
of the agencys existence until long after it was created.14
11. See National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, §§ 101102, 61
Stat. 495, 49699 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 30213024) (merging
intelligence functions across the military branches into the National Security
Council, and establishing a civilian intelligence agency, the Central
Intelligence Agency). Cf. Sean Gallagher, A Short History of the NSA, JURIST
(July 22, 2013, 9:14 AM), http://jurist.org/feature/2013/07/nsa-overview-2.php
(The US military and intelligence agencies transformed in the aftermath of
World War II.).
12. See Gallagher, supra note 11.
13. Memorandum from President Harry S. Truman to the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Defense (Oct. 24, 1952),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/docs/doc02.pdf. See generally
THOMAS L. BURNS, CTR. FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY, NATL SEC. AGENCY, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 19401952 (U), at 99108
(1990), https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/origins_of
_nsa.pdf (describing the Brownell Committee Report, which outlined the needs
of a new intelligence agency and was adopted in large part in President
Trumans memorandum establishing the NSA).
14. See Gallagher, supra note 11 (The Agency remained relatively
unknown to the American Public. But during the course of a 1975 US Senate
investigation, many Americans learned that not only did the NSA exist, but
that it monitored Americans.); Daniel Schorr, A Brief History of the NSA,
NATL PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2006, 8:00 AM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5176847 ([T]he multi-
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B. NSA PRE-PATRIOT ACT
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
explicitly endowed the NSA with a statutory basis for its
various powers.15 Generally, this act authorized the NSA to
surveil foreign powers and their agents suspected of terrorism
or espionage without a warrant.16 The act required that to
intentionally surveil a United States person, the NSA needed
to establish probable cause that the target is an agent of a
foreign power.17 The original FISA broadly authorized the use
of any electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device to
obtain the contents of any wire or radio communication.18
Additionally, FISAs pre-Patriot Act amendments
authorized the use of pen registers, trap and trace devices,19
and court orders compelling the production of tangible things.20
billion dollar agency had been a deep secret until it was unveiled in a Senate
investigation in 1975.).
15. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18011811, 18211829, 18411846, 18611862,
1871).
16. Id. § 102, 92 Stat. at 1786 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) ([T]he
President . . . may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order . . .
directed at . . . the acquisition of the contents of communications transmitted
by means of communications used exclusively between or among foreign
powers . . . . (emphasis added)); id. § 101, 92 Stat. at 1783 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1801(a)) (defining Foreign power, inter alia, as a group engaged in
international terrorism).
17. Id. § 105, 92 Stat. at 1790 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)
(requiring probable cause to believe that . . . the target of the electronic
surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power . . . .); see id. §
101, 92 Stat. at 178384 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)) (defining agent of
a Foreign power to include any person who knowingly engages or aids or
abets intelligence activities of a Foreign power).
18. Id. § 101, 92 Stat. at 1785 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)) (providing a
definition of electronic surveillance).
19. Pen registers and trap and trace devices are physical devices that can
be used to record the numbers dialed, but not the contents, of incoming and
outgoing calls on a telephone line. The use of such devices by law enforcement
was only restricted in 1986 when Congress required law enforcement to obtain
a warrant for their use; however, their use in intelligence surveillance was
allowed through sealed FISA Court orders and may be done without any court
order in times of emergency or war. See Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (making the use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices illegal without a warrant); Intelligence
Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404
10 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18411846).
20. See Intelligence Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §
602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18611862) (allowing
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The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 mandated
a warrant for the use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices by traditional law enforcementeven when the Fourth
Amendment itself did not require a warrantas their use is a
form of metadata collection.21 The NSA was given
Congressional authority in 1998 to use pen registers and trap
and trace devices if the agency obtained an order from the
FISA Court finding that the use of the techniques was based on
an investigation to gather foreign intelligence or information on
international terrorism.22
Another development from FISA was the creation of the
Foreign Information Surveillance Court (FISC), which grants
or denies government requests for data collection.23 This court
is comprised of eleven district court judges and is charged with
issuing warrants to surveil the NSAs targets.24 The FISC
handles both electronic and physical surveillance.25 The act
also created the Court of Review, which hears appeals of the
the NSA to compel, through court order, physical records from common
carriers, and prohibiting the common carrier from disclosing that the records
were sought or obtained), replaced after expiration by USA FREEDOM Act of
2015, Pub. L. 114-23, §§ 101103, 129 Stat. 268, 26972 (codified at 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 18611862 (West 2015)); see also Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, § 807, 108 Stat. 3423 (1994)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18211829) (authorizing the use of a physical search
into premises or property for purposes of seizure, reproduction, inspection,
or alteration of information, material, or property when a person would have
a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law
enforcement purposes).
21. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
508, § 301, 100 Stat. 1848, 186872 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
31213127 (2012)) (requiring a warrant for these investigative methods).
22. Intelligence Authorization Act for 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 601,
112 Stat. 2396, 240410 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18411846).
23. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-511, §
103, 92 Stat. 1783, 1788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)).
24. Id. ([D]esignate 11 district court judges from at least seven of the
United States judicial circuits . . . .).
25. Id. ([The court] shall have jurisdiction to hear applications for and
grant orders approving electronic surveillance anywhere within the United
States.); 50 U.S.C. § 1822(b)(c) (addressing physical searches).
2016] MOSAIC THEORY 983
FISCs decisions.26 Twelve warrants have been denied by the
FISC over a course of thirty-three years.27
Congress withheld three types of surveillance from FISAs
authorization: (1) electronic communications outside U.S.
borders, (2) surveillance in the U.S. and overseas following
outside the statutory definition of electronic communication,
and (3) incidental collection of U.S. person communication.28
Realizing that these types of surveillance are different from
those that traditionally fell within FISAs authorization,
President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333 to address the
NSAs powers in that area.29
The order allowed for physical surveillance of U.S. persons
overseas if the purpose was to obtain significant information
that otherwise could not be acquired.30 Additionally, by
authorizing retention of data collected on U.S. citizens while
pursuing foreign intelligence targets and information, E.O.
12333 effectively did away with a requirement the agency
make individualized showings of suspicion before collecting the
data, and effectively removes any limits on the volume of data
that could be collected.31
26. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) ([The court of review is comprised of] three
judges, one of whom shall be publicly designated as the presiding judge, from
the United States district courts or courts of appeals . . . .).
27. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979-2014,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://www.epic.org/privacy/wiretap
/stats/fisa_stats.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
28. Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International
Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 117, 144 (2015)
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 5054 (1978)).
29. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1982); see Mission, NATL
SECURITY AGENCY, https://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/index.shtml (last
modified Apr. 15, 2011) (describing Executive Order 12333 as delineat[ing]
the NSA/CSS roles and responsibilities to include: collection of intelligence
information, managing the National Security Systems, and advocating for
security regulations).
30. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.4(d).
31. See id. § 2.3 (authorizing the collection and retention of information
concerning United States persons as long as it is information obtained in the
course of a lawful foreign intelligence . . . or international terrorism
investigation; [i]nformation acquired by overhead reconnaissance not
directed at specific United States persons; or [i]ncidentally obtained
information that may indicate involvement in activities that may violate
federal, state, local or foreign laws). See generally Executive Order No. 12333,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2016) (Executive Order 12333 authorizes the collection
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The NSAs powerbefore September 11, 2001 and the
passage of the Patriot Actwas laid out primarily in FISA of
1978, FISAs further amendments, as well as E.O. 12333.
Although these documents do not offer a large amount of
specificity about the limits of conduct the NSA was authorized
to conduct, it is clear that the agency was able to surveil
communications of those suspected of espionage or terrorism.
Furthermore, E.O. 12333 clarified these powers by authorizing
retention of data collected on U.S. citizens.32
C. EXPANSION OF NSA POWER
A large shift occurred in the NSAs scope after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States
(9/11)33 and the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot
Act).34 The United States Government, whether actually
warranted or not, felt that steps were needed to protect the
population from further terrorist attacks.35 The Patriot Act
broadened the powers of the NSA;36 most prominently through
Section 215 of the act, which authorized a large amount of new
surveillance policies.37 The 2008 FISA Amendments also
enlarged the NSAs powers.38 The Bush Administration
of not only metadata, but of the actual communications of US citizens, so long
as the communications are collected incidentally.).
32. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, § 2.3 (1982).
33. See generally September 11th Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 7, 2015, 12:41
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/
(describing the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11, 2001).
34. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22
U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., and 50 U.S.C.).
35. See generally G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the
Human Right to Privacy, 59 LOY. L. REV. 861, 87780, 883 (2013) (providing a
timeline of changes at the NSA after 9/11).
36. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
37. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 28788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18611862),
replaced after expiration by USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, §§
101103, 129 Stat. 268, 26972 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 18611862 (West
2015)) (prohibiting the bulk collection of tangible things in place of the old
authority to broadly access business records). See generally Donohue, supra
note 28, at 12431 (highlighting the provisions used to collect bulk Internet
metadata and content, and the evolving interpretive theories used to defend
the collection programs).
38. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified in part at 50 U.S.C. §§
1861, 1881, 1885 (2012)). See generally Sinha, supra note 35, at 87780, 883
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believed that the passage of both these laws were vital to
protecting Americas national security after 9/11.39
The Patriot Act amended FISA.40 Section 215 of the act has
garnered tremendous attention, as it allowed the government
to request an order from the FISC that would require targets to
turn over tangible items to the agency, such as business
records.41 Section 215 originally stated that the government
shall specify that the records concerned are sought for an
investigation into international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.42 However the 2006 amendments to the
Patriot Act lessened the burden, only requiring a statement of
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation.43 The government used this provision to obtain
bulk metadata from American telecom companies.44 However,
89 (discussing the political battle over the passage of the 2008 amendments
and provisions that survived into the final law).
39. See Sinha, supra note 35, at 883 (In late July of 2007, claiming that
[o]ur national security depend[ed] on it, President Bush used a radio address
to call for further revision or modernization of FISA. (alterations in original)
(citation omitted)).
40. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
41. Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 28788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18611862)
(replacing the authority to order a common carrier to release records upon a
showing of specific and articulable facts that the records pertain to a foreign
power or an agent with a generic authority to issue an order requiring the
production of any tangible things including things pertaining to a United
States person as long as the investigation was not solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the first amendment), replaced after expiration by USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, §§ 101103, 129 Stat. at 26972
(codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 18611862 (West 2015)).
42. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. at
28788 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18611862 (2012)) (requiring an order to
pertain to an investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities), replaced after expiration by USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, §§ 101103, 129 Stat. at 26972
(codified at 50 §§ 18611862 (West 2015)).
43. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, § 106, 120 Stat. 192, 196 (2006) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861
(2012)), replaced after expiration by USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-
23, §§ 101103, 129 Stat. at 26972 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 18611862
(West 2015)).
44. See generally Donohue, supra note 28, at 12628 (The Administration
initially based the Presidents authority to conduct the Presidents
Surveillance Program on three legal theories: (1) the Presidents inherent
Article II authorities as Commander in Chief; (2) the 2001 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (AUMF); (3) and the War Powers Resolution
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there has been recent pushback against the validity of this
interpretation of these amendments. In 2015, the Second
Circuit ruled that Section 215 actually did not authorize the
bulk collection of telephony metadata and the NSA had
exceeded its statutory authorization.45 Another controversial
aspect of Section 215, was that the FISC orders were done ex
parte, and once one was issued, the reasons why it was issued
could not be discussed.46
Additionally, the 2008 FISA Amendments further
broadened the NSAs powers.47 While these amendments were
not part of the Patriot Act, they were also enacted during the
post-9/11 period when the U.S. Government was engaged in a
global war on terrorism. After the passage of the Patriot Act,
amidst terrorism concerns, the Bush administration took part
in further surveillance programs without Congressional
approval.48 Specifically, the administration took part in
collection of both contents and metadata collected from
telephony records and e-mails.49 Despite pushback from
(WPR) . . . . In the face of mounting pressure, the legal basis for the component
parts of the Presidents Surveillance Program gradually altered. On May 24,
2006, the NSA transferred the bulk collection of telephony metadata to FISAs
Section 501 tangible things provisions (as amended by USA PATRIOT Act
Section 215). (footnotes omitted)).
45. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015)
([W]e hold that the text of § 215 cannot bear the weight the government asks
us to assign to it, and that it does not authorize the telephone metadata
program.).
46. See id. at 82830 (The FISCs hearings are, as noted, held ex parte.);
see also 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c), (d) (2012) (providing for ex parte judicial orders,
and prohibiting disclosure of any order), replaced after expiration by USA
FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, §§ 101103, 129 Stat. at 26972
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(d) (West 2015)) (preserving ex
parte judicial orders and prohibition on disclosure of any orders, but
prohibiting bulk collection of tangible things).
47. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436.
48. See Donohue, supra note 28, at 12526 (citing confidential documents
released by The Guardian, including Authorization for Specified Electronic
Surveillance activities During a Limited Period to detect and Prevent Acts of
Terrorism Within the United States, Oct. 4, 2011, cited in OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., NATL SEC. AGENCY CTR. SEC. SERV., WORKING DRAFT ST-
01-0002, at 1, 78, 11, 15 (2009)). See generally NSA Inspector General Report
on Email and Internet Data Collection Under Stellar Wind  Full Document,
GUARDIAN (June 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive
/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspector-general-report-document-data-collection.
49. See Donohue, supra note 28, at 12526.
2016] MOSAIC THEORY 987
Congress and from the public against the executive branch
claiming such broad powers, Congress eventually amended
FISA in a way that allowed statutory authorization for these
broader intelligence gathering activities.50 Section 702 of the
2008 amendments allowed for the targeting of persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to
acquire foreign intelligence information.51 Additionally, when
a telecom provider is provided with an order under Section 702,
they must obey it unless the request is determined to be
unlawful by FISC.52 Failure to turn over the communication
records, without such a determination, could result in being
found in contempt.53 While Section 702 focused on non-U.S.
persons outside the United States, Sections 703 and 704 dealt
with targeting U.S. persons outside the country.54 These
sections require similar, but somewhat different showings
before records must be turned over to the government. Once
the government requests an order from the FISC, the court
must determine if the subject, or communication, is indeed
abroad.55 Section 704 is more lax than Section 703, as it does
not require the government show that collection could be done
by normal investigative means, and does not require the same
extent of minimization as 702 or 703.56
The 2008 Amendments also declared that telecom
companies must turn over records to the NSA and comply with
the issuance of mass acquisition orders that target entire
categories of individuals, rather than individualized orders
pertaining to a specific subject.57 Reaffirming the Bush
50. See id at 13738.
51. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 101, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1881a (2012)) (adding Section 702 to FISA).
52. Id. at 122 Stat. at 245357 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(c)).
53. Id.
54. See Donohue, supra note 28, at 142.
55. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 101, 122 Stat. at 2448, 2453 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881b1881c).
56. See id. at 122 Stat. at 2454 (codified at § 1881c(c)(1)(C)). See generally
Donohue, supra note 28, at 14344 (comparing legal standards and
requirements between Sections 703 and 704).
57. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, §§ 801804, 122 Stat. at 246770 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 18851885c); see PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD.,
REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION
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administrations original desire, Section 702 allows captur[ing]
[the] content of communications. This could include content in
emails, instant messages, Facebook messages, web browsing
history, and more.58 With the passage of the Amendments,
specifically Sections 702 through 704, FISA became the
primary tool for surveilling overseas targets, rather than E.O.
12333, which had previously been the primary justification.59
As a result of the Patriot Act and the 2008 FISA
Amendments, NSAs powers were greatly expanded. At that
point, the agency could request ex parte mass acquisition orders
of records from American telecom companies, and the
companies would gain immunity in any action surrounding
compliance with an order.60 Also, the agency could target non-
Americans for up to a year.61 The metadata collection program
the NSA has been conducting on U.S. citizens, under its
authority from the Patriot act, was held to be likely
unconstitutional by the District Court for the District of
Columbia until the Appeals court reversed;62 however, the
domestic metadata collection program is just one of the many
new tools at the disposal of the NSA in post-9/11 America.63
702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (2014),
https://www.pclob.gov/Library/702-Report-2.pdf (There is no requirement that
the government demonstrate probable cause to believe that an individual
targeted is an agent of a foreign power, as is generally required in the
traditional FISA process under Title I of the statute. Instead, the Section 702
certifications identify categories of information to be collected, which must
meet the statutory definition of foreign intelligence information.).
58. Dia Kayyali, The Way the NSA Uses Section 702 Is Deeply Troubling.
Heres Why, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 8, 2014, 5:10 PM),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/way-nsa-uses-section-702-deeply-
troubling-heres-why. Contents of communications have garnered greater
protections in American law than records of those communications. See Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 27012711 (2012) (requiring a warrant for
collection of contents, while only requiring a court order for production of
records); In re Application of the United States of America for Historical Cell
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 61112 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that cellular phone
location data is defined as records and thus does not require a warrant).
59. See Donohue, supra note 28, at 142.
60. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881a(h)(3), 18851885c.
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
62. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2942 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated
and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
63. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 2.
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D. EDWARD SNOWDEN
Due to the NSAs institutional secrecy, investigative
journalists and whistleblowers from within the intelligence
community play an essential role in informing the public of the
NSAs operations. The most recent, and arguably most
significant, such disclosure occurred in 2013 when Edward
Snowden copied thousands of NSA internal documents and
disclosed them to various media sources. While not a direct
employee of the NSA, Snowden was a technician and contractor
for the agency, which gave him access to various files about the
agencys surveillance practices.64 When working as a contractor
in Hawaii, Snowden cop[ied] and back[ed] up hundreds of
thousands, maybe millions of pages of documents.65 He did
this in preparation for his memorable leaks to the media
starting with the British newspaper, The Guardian.66 In
summer of 2013, through journalist Glenn Greenwald,
Snowden leaked that telecom companiesspecifically Verizon
firsthad been turning over their customers records to the
United States Government, without warrants and under
direction of the NSA pursuant to FISC orders.67 Snowden
followed this disclosure with various others, including one to
the Washington Post claiming that the NSAthrough its
program named PRISMhad direct access to the servers of
64. See Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower
Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-
whistleblower-surveillance; Terry Gross, Edward Snowden: From Geeky
Dropout to NSA Leaker, NATL PUB. RADIO (Apr. 16, 2014, 3:44 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/04/16/303733011/edward-snowden-from-geeky-drop-
out-to-nsa-leaker.
65. See Gross, supra note 64.
66. Greenwald et al., supra note 64; see also Joshua Eaton & Ben Piven,
Timeline of Edward Snowdens Revelations, AL-JAZEERA AM.,
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/multimedia/timeline-edward-snowden-
revelations.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
67. See Greenwald, supra note 2; see, e.g., In re Application of the Fed.
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No.
BR-05 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), [https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files
/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf] (original Section 215
order to Verizon authorizing bulk telephony metadata collection). Snowden
was put into contact with Greenwald after reaching out to filmmaker Laura
Poitras in early 2013. Irin Carmon, How We Broke the NSA Story, SALON
(June 10, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/06/10
/qa_with_laura_poitras_the_woman_behind_the_nsa_scoops.
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Apple, Microsoft, and Google.68 Former NSA director Keith
Alexander estimated Snowdens disclosures at somewhere
between 50,000 and 200,000 documents.69 Snowdens
disclosures led to negative reactions from the U.S.
Government,70 and as a result he has relocated to Russia to
avoid possible prosecution. However, the disclosures have also
led to a shift in opinions on the use of government surveillance
and government power in general.71 Citizens now view the
issue with more skepticism, or at the very least, Snowden has
raised awareness.72
E. ATTEMPTS TO CURB AND ALTER THE NSA
Much has been made of the NSA and its programs since
the Snowden revelations. Specifically, there have been
legislative and judicial attempts to curb the agencys collection
programs.73 However, steps have also been taken to revamp
and strengthen the nations data collection programs.74
In summer 2015, political debate circled around the
expiration of key provisions of the Patriot Act.75 Provisions that
were set to expire included: the metadata collection program
contained in Section 215; the ability to use a roving wiretap
on all communication devices connected to a target without an
68. See Eaton & Piven, supra note 66.
69. Mark Hosenball, NSA Chief Says Snowden Leaked up to 200,000
Secret Documents, REUTERS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.reuters.com
/article/us-usa-security-nsa-idUSBRE9AD19B20131114.
70. See Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC
(Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964
([Snowden] has been charged in the US with theft of government
property . . . .).
71. See, e.g., Gao, supra note 1; LoGiurato, supra note 1.
72. See, e.g., Gao, supra note 1.
73. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2942 (D.D.C. 2013)
(granting a preliminary injunction against government surveillance on
constitutional grounds), vacated and remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(per curiam); Chappell, supra note 4 (describing the USA Freedom Act, which
revived but constrained the Patriot Act).
74. E.g. Kelsey Rupp,Meet the NSAs Next Surveillance Program that Was
Just Snuck Through in the Congress Omnibus Bill, INDEP. J. REV. (Dec. 2015),
https://www.ijreview.com/2015/12/495767-surveillance-omnibus-bill-draf
(describing an omnibus spending bill that encourages private sector
companies to share their consumers information with the government and
other companies).
75. See Chappell, supra note 4 (The vote comes two days after
controversial provisions of the Patriot Act expired . . . .).
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individualized warrant for each target; and the ability to target
lone wolf terrorists, who have no ties to any terror
organizations.76 Many civil libertarian-leaning politicians,
including Rand Paul and Bernie Sanders, celebrated the end of
the legislation.77 However, some politicians feared that without
an extensive data collection system in place, the United States
could fall victim to acts of terrorism, as the nations national
security would become severely compromised.78 In response to
this fear, Congress passed the Freedom Act.79 The act rescued,
in some form, the three provisions from the Patriot Act that
many national security-minded politicians feared losing.80 The
act extended the deadlines for the lone wolf provision and the
roving wire taps until 2019.81 Moreover, it limited the
polarizing powers of Section 215 by banning mass metadata
collection unless the government has reasonable, articulable
suspicion that a specific selection term used to request
telephone data is associated with terrorism.82 Despite these
provision, staunch detractors of government surveillance did
not vote for it, as they viewed it as too weak of an attempt to
limit government surveillance.83
In addition to the legislative attempt to constrain the
authorizations of power to the NSA, the courts have also been
employed to challenge the legality of the agencys actions. The
first notable challenge against the NSAs mass surveillance
programs was in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA.84
76. See Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act Provisions Expire: What Happens
Now?, CNN (June 1, 2015, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/politics
/what-happens-if-the-patriot-act-provisions-expire/.
77. See Chappell, supra note 4 (Both Paul and Sanders voted against the
USA Freedom Act).
78. See Diamond, supra note 76.
79. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268
(codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 3414, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 22802281, 2332(i), 2709, 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 18411843, 18611862, 18711874, 1881a (West 2015)). The
official title of the act is Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling
Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015. Id.
80. See Chappell, supra note 4; USA Freedom Act: Whats in, Whats out,
WASH. POST (June 2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/politics/usa-freedom-act/.
81. See USA Freedom Act: Whats in, Whats out, supra note 80.
82. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. at
270 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2015)).
83. See Chappell, supra note 4.
84. Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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Amnesty International challenged the application of Section
702 of FISA as amended in the 2008 FISA Amendments.85 That
section allows the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence to acquire foreign intelligence
information by jointly authorizing the surveillance of
individuals who are not United States persons.86 However,
before reaching the merits of that case, the Supreme Court
determined that the respondents did not have standing to
challenge the law because they could not demonstrate that the
future injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending and
because they cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs
in anticipation of non-imminent harm.87 After this decision, it
seemed unlikely that anyone would have standing to challenge
the NSAs surveillance programs, as it would seem almost
impossible for challengers to prove that the NSA is specifically
targeting them.88 However, Edward Snowdens disclosures in
2013 offered support to those seeking standing to challenge the
NSA.89
Edward Snowdens disclosures led to the eventual
challenges that resulted in American Civil Liberties Union v.
Clapper and Obama v. Klayman. American Civil Liberties
Union held that the mass metadata collection methods of the
NSA exceeded their Section 215 authorization.90 The district
judge ignored the statutory question and upheld the legality of
the programs, as [c]lear precedent applies because Smith held
that a subscriber has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
85. Id. at 114243; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a (West 2015).
86. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1142.
87. Id. at 1155.
88. See id. at 1148 ([R]espondents merely speculate and make
assumptions about whether their communications with their foreign contacts
will be acquired under §1881a.).
89. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance,
42 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 52030 (2015) (discussing standing issues before and
after Snowden, noting different courts considerations of factual information
disclosed by Snowden); Caspar S. Miller, Note, Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA: The Certainly Impending Standard for Article III
Standing in Government Surveillance Cases, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 559, 587
(2014) (One thing is clear, however, both of the district courts pointed out
that the Snowden revelations, as well as other declassified information and
decisions, provided the ammunition these plaintiffs needed to establish
standing under Clapper.).
90. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 2015).
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telephony metadata created by third parties.91 Despite this
apparent strong adherence to precedent, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the trial courts
decision.92 The Second Circuit held that FISA could be
subjected to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act, since nothing in FISAs text or legislative
history precluded it from reviewan determination the district
court had not made believing it could not conduct a review.93
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the Patriot Act
required the metadata collected to be relevant to approved
counterterrorism efforts, but noted that the telephone
metadata program . . . seeks to compile data in advance of the
need to conduct any inquiry (or even to examine the data), and
is based on no evidence of any current connection between the
data being sought and any existing inquiry.94 As a result, the
court ruled that the metadata collection program overstepped
its statutory basis and thus was illegal.95 This decision became
moot less than a month later, with the passage of the USA
Freedom Act.96 It is important to note that the different
outcomes result from the trial court focusing on constitutional
analysis, which it believed was justified by the need for
national security and the third-party doctrine,97 while the
appeals court reviewed the statutory bases of the agencys
91. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787, 822
(2d Cir. 2015) (referencing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). Under
the third-party doctrine, a citizen relinquishes any such privacy expectation in
information that she discloses to a third party, be it a personal confidant or a
business entity, even if he or she assumed that the information would be held
confidentially. Gentithes, supra note 9 at 37.
92. See Am. Civil Liberties Union, 785 F.3d at 826 (vacating the district
courts judgment).
93. Id. at 80607.
94. Id. at 81718. The relevant provision discussed in the case was 50
U.S.C. § 1861 (2012), replaced after expiration by USA FREEDOM Act of 2015,
Pub. L. 114-23, §§ 101103, 129 Stat. 268, 26972 (50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West
2015)).
95. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 785 F.3d at 821.
96. See USA Freedom Act: Whats in, Whats out, supra note 80 (The
[USA Freedom Act] bans the bulk collection of data of Americans telephone
records and Internet metadata.).
97. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 742
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Even if the statutory claim were not precluded, it would
fail.), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787, 822 (2d Cir.
2015).
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actions, something the district court did not believe it had the
power to do.98
Additionally, Obama v. Klayman, reached a similar
conclusion, although it reached its conclusion on strictly
constitutional grounds, rather than for statutory reasons.
Judge Leon at the District Court for the District of Columbia
held that plaintiffs have a substantial likelihood of showing
that their privacy interests outweigh the Governments interest
in collecting and analyzing bulk telephony metadata and
therefore the NSAs bulk collection program is indeed an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.99 He then
ordered injunctive relief for the plaintiffs, but stayed his order
pending appeal.100 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the plaintiffs did not meet the burden of proof
to sustain the injunction, but remanded it back to the trial
court for a conclusive ruling on the merits.101 Judge Leons
decision illustrates both the constitutional limitations of the
NSAs programs and the increasing skepticism courts have
been using when analyzing the NSAs programs, either for
constitutionality or statutory analysis.
Although there have been steps to limit the NSAs power,
there have also been steps taken, specifically by the most
recent Congress, to strengthen surveillance.102 Very recently,
Congress passed some provisions of the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act (CISA) into law,103 which has drawn
sharp criticism from civil libertarians, as many view it as a new
form of the Patriot Act.104 Although Congress tries to
98. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 785 F.3d at 821.
99. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 41 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated and
remanded, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
100. Id. at 43.
101. Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d at 562.
102. E.g., Rupp, supra note 74 (describing the version of the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act of 2015 that was included in an omnibus bill).
103. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. N,
129 Stat. 2242, 293585 (2015) (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 301, 6 U.S.C.A. §§
131, 148, 151, 15011510, 15221525, 15311533, 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 35533554
(West 2015)).
104. See generally Lucian Armasu, Meet CISA, a De Facto Cyber Patriot
Act, TOMS HARDWARE (Dec. 16, 2015, 9:30 AM),
http://www.tomshardware.com/news/cisa-the-cyber-patriot-act,30771.html
(Paul Ryan managed to push CISA into the omnibus budget bill, but not
before Congress stripped out all of its privacy protections and turned it from
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characterize the act as a way for businesses and the
government to share information in hopes of fighting terrorism
and cyber-hacking, detractors view this bill as a wholeand
especially the specific provisions passed into lawas a new
way for the federal government to collect data from telecom
companies.105 Critics of the act claim that this act simply
remov[es] privacy and liability protections [from telecom
companies] for the sake of cybersecurity.106 Evan Greer,
campaign director for the digital rights group known as Fight
For the Future, has stated that CISA is the new Patriot Act.
Its a bill that was born out of a climate of fear and passed
quickly and quietly using a broken and nontransparent
process.107 To some, the Patriot Act and CISA both potentially
authorize third-party disclosure of customer information to the
government.108 Due to the recent passage of this law, analysis
is limited. Nonetheless, the executive branch is required to
implement all statutes within the confines of the authorities
given and the Constitution, so the future of CISA depends on
how the government designs its surveillance programs.
The passage of the Freedom Act and the federal court
decisions discussed above can be looked at as statements on the
illegality and unconstitutionality of the NSAs surveillance
programs, and indicative of a growing trend to look at NSA
programs with skepticism and concern. However, the Freedom
Act may be no different than the Patriot Act.109 CISA offers
very new challenges for understanding how the NSA is
operating its surveillance programs, and will become a new
what was originally meant to be a cybersecurity bill into a de
facto surveillance bill.).
105. See Rupp, supra note 74.
106. Id.
107. Jenna McLaughlin, Hasty, Fearful Passage of Cybersecurity Bill
Recalls Patriot Act, INTERCEPT (Dec. 19, 2015, 10:05 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2015/12/19/hasty-fearful-passage-of-cybersecurity-bill-
recalls-patriot-act.
108. See id. ([CISA would] make all of us more vulnerable to cyber attacks
by letting corporations off the hook instead of holding them accountable when
they fail to protect their customers sensitive information.).
109. See Chappell, supra note 4 (noting some pro-privacy advocates
characterizing the Freedom Act as a decisive victory while others opposed the
bill as a mere continuation of the Patriot Act). But see USA Freedom Act:
Whats in, Whats out, supra note 80 (detailing some differences between the
USA Freedom Act and the Patriot Act).
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focal point for those who question the NSAs tactics.110
However, if the fears of privacy advocates turn out to be
correct, the United States may have to deal with the
consequences of another Patriot Act.111
F. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
Katz v. United States crafted the reasonable expectations
of privacy test, which has been the paramount test used in
Fourth Amendment analysis.112 In Katz, the government
wiretapped a phone booth, and the Court determined that
where an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment were triggered, as a
search has been conducted.113 In comparison to traditional
notions of the Fourth Amendmentwhich had typically
required physical trespass for a search to take place114Katz is
arguably not very intrusive, as it took place in a public phone
booth and involved transmission of messages through the
telephone. Nonetheless, the court determined the intrusion to
be a search and the Fourth Amendment had been violated.115
Justice Harlans concurrence, which has become the
controlling opinion from the case, crafted the reasonable
expectations of privacy test.116 The test posits that a search
takes place when the governments intrudes into an area where
the citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy.117
Specifically, the test requires that there is an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy, and this expectation is reasonable.118
110. See Rupp, supra note 74 (characterizing CISA as a de facto cyber
Patriot Act and arguing that CISA may end up being used by the NSA to
conduct mass surveillance as the agency did before the Freedom Act).
111. See id.
112. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
113. Id.
114. See id. at 35253 ([T]he absence of such [physical] penetration was at
one time thought to foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry . . . .).
115. Id. at 35859.
116. Id. at 36061 (Harlan, J., concurring).
117. Id.
118. Id. (characterizing the critical facts establishing a subjective and
reasonable expectation as the individual entering the phone booth, shut[ing]
the door behind him, which entitles him to assume that his conversation is
not being intercepted).
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Another overarching concept derived from Katz is the idea that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.119
G. THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
One of the primary legal doctrines used by the federal
government to justify its surveillance programs has been the
third-party doctrine.120 The third-party doctrine states that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information
he voluntarily turns over to third parties.121 The Supreme
Court has used this reasoning as grounds for upholding law
enforcements surveillance for decades.122
In Smith v. Maryland, the Court considered the Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches in the
context of a law enforcement practice of compelling telephone
companies to install pen registers to monitor incoming and
outgoing telephone numbers.123 The Court held the surveillance
practice did not violate the Fourth Amendment under the
theory that the defendant in that case voluntarily turned over
his information to the telephone provider, who then voluntarily
turned that information over to the government.124 Under this
theory, the act of turning over information is paramount, and
the individuals presumptions of privacy are secondary at
best[u]nder the third-party doctrine, a citizen relinquishes
any such privacy expectation in information that she discloses
to a third party, be it a personal confidant or a business entity,
even if he or she assumed that the information would be held
confidentially.125 Under third-party doctrine, even if an
individual expects information he or she discloses to a third-
party to be confidential, and thus satisfying the first prong of
119. Id. at 351 (majority opinion); see id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(The point is not that the booth is accessible to the public at other times, but
that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants expectation
of freedom from intrusions are recognized as reasonable. (citation omitted)).
120. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 74950
(S.D.N.Y. 2013), affd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.
2015).
121. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 74344 (1979) (This Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 73638.
124. Id. at 74345.
125. Gentithes, supra note 9, at 37.
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the reasonable expectations of privacy test as crafted in Katz,
the second prong is not satisfied, as that expectation is not
reasonable.126 This doctrine was memorialized in United States
v. Miller, where the Court held that an individual that turns
information over to a third party does not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in that information.127
Third-party doctrine has also been rigidly applied at the
trial court level. In American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper,
Judge Willian Pauley upheld the NSAs data collection
programs because [Maryland] held that a subscriber has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in telephony metadata
created by third parties.128 While third-party doctrine makes
sense in the context of facilitating criminal investigations and
prosecutions, such as when building evidence against a
organized criminal gang; however, using the doctrine to justify
collection of various pieces of information from innocent
citizens presents problems. As the courts have noted, in the
present day, people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks and in doing so, unconsciously, rather than
voluntarily, open themselves up to surveillance by the
government.129 Applying the third-party doctrine is becoming
more of a problem because the use of modern technology has so
permeated every aspect of our lives that the elimination of
human interaction is a standard business practice and as a
126. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The reasonable expectation of privacy test posits that a search
occurs when the governments intrudes onto private action in which the
private actor both has an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and this
expectation is reasonable. See id.
127. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1978).
128. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citingMaryland, 442 U.S. at 74445), affd in part, vacated in
part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787, 822 (2d Cir. 2015).
129. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). Justice Sotomayor lists examples of these disclosures as the
following: the phone numbers that [individuals] dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they
correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and
medications they purchase to online retailers. Id.
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result there is not meaningful exposure to other individuals
that are not mediated by third-party technologies.130
H. MOSAIC THEORY
The United States Supreme Court has hinted toward
discomfort with applying archaic Fourth Amendment analysis
to modern technological instances in general. In United States
v. Jones, the Supreme Court alluded to discomfort with third-
party doctrine,131 and in Riley v. California openly
acknowledged that modern citizens carry around their entire
lives in devices such as cellular phones, which may require
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a whole to be
reevaluated.132
In an attempt to solve practical problems that arise when
trying to apply third-party doctrine to modern technological
times, scholars have developed what is known as mosaic
theory.133 Mosaic theory posits that eventually a collection of
discrete intrusions into ones private life offer such broad
insight into ones actions and intentions that the intrusions
130. Deven Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational
Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 618
(2014).
131. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 96364.
132. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 248485, 248991 (2014).
133. See generally Kerr, supra note 8, at 32843 (identifying problems with
applying mosaic theory as a standard in Fourth Amendment cases); Courtney
E. Walsh, Surveillance Technology and the Loss of Something a Lot Like
Privacy: An Examination of the Mosaic Theory and the Limits of the Fourth
Amendment, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 169, 22245 (2012) (considering the
merits of judicial application of mosaic theory as a constitutional analysis
versus as a theoretical statutory analysis); Erin Smith Dennis, Note, A Mosaic
Shield: Maynard, the Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Rights in the Digital
Age, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 76371 (2011) (arguing that mosaic theory is
incompatible with third-party doctrine and even basic forms of electronic
surveillance like pen registers). Although the true origin of the term mosaic
theory is contested, many trace it back to the an argument used by the
Federal Government, in which the government argued in the context of state
secrets, that it could not turn over individual pieces of sensitive information
even if they would not reveal anything substantial, because the accumulation
of data, in the form of a mosaic, would reveal state secrets that could
compromise the nations well-being. See U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 8 (1953).
The government seemingly flips this argument in the case of the Fourth
Amendment. In the national security realm, they argue that there are various
bits of information that on the whole could reveal important, private matters,
but that in the Fourth Amendment context this is not a concern.
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become a search subject to the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.134 Put differently:
Under the mosaic theory, searches can be analyzed as a collective
sequence of steps rather than as individual steps. Identifying Fourth
Amendment searches requires analyzing police actions over time as
a collective mosaic of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a
collective Fourth Amendment search even though the individual
steps taken in isolation do not.135
This type of mosaic search would involve a host of
relatively non-intrusive government actions that become a
search because data from a GPS company, a cellular phone
company, a search company, a credit card company, or a
retailer reveals all the details of [a] persons life [and] no
sophisticated . . . analysis is required [to] tell you exactly where
someone went, what they bought, or what they read.136
The United States Supreme Court has alluded to mosaic
theory as a viable legal option for establishing where Fourth
Amendment boundaries exist when faced with applying third-
party doctrine to instances of modern technology.137 Justice
Sotomayor, in her concurring opinions in Jones, explicitly
brings up the necessity of revisiting third-party doctrine,
stating that it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.138 In the
same case, Justice Alito, writing in a separate concurrence,
suggested that extended use of the GPS tracker in that case,
rather than one discrete use, transformed the surveillance into
a Fourth Amendment search.139 This is analogous to the
collection of various small pieces of information on ones life
eventually constituting a traditional search. In United States v.
Maynard, the D.C. Circuit openly acknowledged, and adopted,
mosaic theory.140 It concluded that the sum of various
intrusions into the petitioners privacy resulted in an
unconstitutional warrantless search.141
134. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 8; Dennis, supra note 133, at 748.
135. Kerr, supra note 8, at 313.
136. Desai, supra note 130, at 616.
137. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95657 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 957.
139. Id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
140. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
affd in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
141. Id. at 56264.
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I. PROBLEMS WITHMOSAIC THEORY
Mosaic theory is not perfect and detractors are quick to
point out its shortcomings. One criticism pertains to the point
at which the isolated intrusions become one searchwhere is
the point where a number of isolated, discrete intrusions
transform into one illegal search?142 Included in this critique is
a more theoretical question, namely: how can non-searches
ever become a search? Justice Scalia frames these potential
issues nicely in Jones, when he, while critiquing the
concurrences, wonders why a 4week investigation is surely
too long . . . [?] What of a 2day monitoring of a suspected
purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6month monitoring of a
suspected terrorist?143 A lack of clear guidance as a legal
standard detracts from mosaic theorys ability to sufficiently
address third-party doctrines flaws.
II. ANALYSIS
A. RESPONSE TO PROFFERED CRITICISMS OFMOSAIC THEORY
1. Each intrusion under third-party doctrine is a partial
search.
The first issue with mosaic theory is that is fails to
distinguish where the discrete intrusions allowed by third-
party doctrine reach a level that causes them to be viewed as a
search.144 Thus far, [t]he best solution that mosaic advocates
have . . . been able to muster is to draw bright, if arbitrary,
lines based on how long officers use an investigative method or
technology.145 However, a better way of responding to that
142. See Gentithes, supra note 9, at 37; Kerr, supra note 8, at 344 (The
[mosaic] theory allows courts to say that techniques are sometimes a search.
They are not searches when grouped in some ways (when no mosaic exists)
but become searches when grouped in other ways (when the mosaic line is
crossed).).
143. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012).
144. See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 954 (majority
opinion); Gentithes, supra note 9, at 3637.
145. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98
MINN. L. REV. 62, 71 (2013). Gray and Citron argue that the solution to the
mosaic theory puzzle should be whether the surveillance used by the
government has the potential to facilitate broad and indiscriminate
surveillance that intrudes upon reasonable expectations of quantitative
privacy by raising the specter of a surveillance state. Id. at 72. However, the
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critique is not to look at length of surveillance, but to look at
overall, actual volume of collection, through the lens of Katz.146
To address this issue with mosaic theory, one must
characterize each intrusion, as an incomplete, or partial search,
not a non-search altogether. This conceptualization leads to
what I call partial search theory, which posits that at some
point the individual partial-searches, when added together,
accumulate into a mass in which the intrusions subject has a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Once that level is met, a
constitutionally protected search has taken place, and a
warrant is required. So, put simply, under partial search
theory, the discrete intrusions into ones private life become a
search at the point where there is both a subjective and a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the mass of information
collected.147 It may be true that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in each individual piece of information,
but it is completely feasible, and expected, that there is a
subjective, reasonable expectation of privacy in the vast
accumulation of various parts of data, each of which pertaining
to a unique aspect of an individuals life.148 Conceptualizing the
limits of partial search theory requires analyzing intrusiveness
in light of the reasonable expectation privacy test. Although not
completely predictive, connecting intrusiveness and
reasonableness to Katz allows courts to use mosaic theory to
protect information from mass surveillance by the NSA. It is
true that this theory will leave discretion for judges, but the
evolution of common law will further shape the doctrine until
response presented in this Note does not focus on the potential to take part in
mass surveillance and the shadows that casts on society, but instead argues
that when the actual volume of data collected becomes such that an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data, the governments actions
trigger Fourth Amendment protections.
146. Cf. Desai, supra note 130, at 616 (discussing the ability to gain
immense access into the private matters of an individuals life based on the
collection of various isolated intrusions into their life).
147. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (explaining the reasonable expectations test as, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable).
148. See generally United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (discussing how additions of cumulative information can transform the
meaning in the information[p]rolonged surveillance reveals types of
information not revealed by short-term surveillance), affd in part sub nom.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
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the test becomes more precise and uniform. That fact that
partial search theory is not neatly defined should not prevent
its effectiveness in providing constitutional protections, as the
reasonable expectation test itself is equally unclear and fact-
driven, yet it has been defined through years of
jurisprudence.149
Mosaic theory may not allow us to exactly locate the point
where the accumulation of non-searches becomes a search, but
it does allow us to conclude when governmental action does
surpass that point. Also, just as the reasonable expectations of
privacy test allows for societal opinions of what is acceptable
government action to guide its determination of reasonable,
partial search theory does the same. The reasonable
expectations of privacy test, which is the standard bearer in
Fourth Amendment analysis, also does not explicate when an
individuals expectations become reasonable, but it, just as
partial search theory, allows a general principle by which
judges can create a body of law.150 The very test that has
guided Fourth Amendment analysis for the decades, namely
the reasonable expectations of privacy standard, as articulated
by Justice Harlan, offers reasoned guidance in applying mosaic
theory.151 When the amount of data collected by the
government becomes so intrusive that the subject of the
surveillance had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
mass of data, a search has been conducted, which requires a
warrant or some other recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.152
2. Legal support for partial search theory
Partial search theory, while novel, has its roots in various
United States Supreme Court decisions.153 In addition, the
theorys creation is a reaction to the changing role in society of
149. See Orin Kerr, Answering Justice Alitos Question: What Makes an
Expectation of Privacy Reasonable?, WASH. POST (May 28, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/05/28
/answering-justice-alitos-question-what-makes-an-expectation-of-privacy-
reasonable/ (discussing and summarizing jurisprudence related to Katz).
150. See id. (arguing that the subjective-expectations prong of the Katz test
is irrelevant).
151. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 36061 (Harlan, J., concurring).
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 954; Katz, 389 U.S. at 36061 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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technology and the conclusion that the law cannot rely on
archaic notions of constitutional law.154 The framers of the
Constitution expected society to evolve,155 and while they could
not have foreseen todays specific technologies, they expected
the Constitution to have continued meaning for structuring
American life, which involves a continuing evolution of the
interpretive theories used to apply the Constitutions text.
Katz supports the creation of partial search theory, as the
accumulation of the partial-searches becomes a search when
the subject of the intrusions has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the collection of intrusions. Both Riley and Jones
also support the creation of this Notes proposal. Riley discusses
various issues related to applying traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to modern technology.156 Chief
Justice Roberts, in the majority decision, states that searching
ones cellular phone incident to lawful arrest would be like
finding a key in a suspects pocket and arguing that it allowed
law enforcement to unlock and search a house.157 From this
analogy, he concludes that there are so many small pieces of
information in the citizens electronics that searching through
themeven if justified under traditional legal doctrineis too
intrusive to be legal under the text of the Constitution.158 The
154. See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(suggesting the third-party doctrine may be ill suited to the digital age).
155. See generally MCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (A
constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried
into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could
scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the
objects themselves.).
156. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (These cases require us to decide how the
search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life.).
157. Id. at 2491.
158. The government in Riley argued that the search of the cellular phone
was justified under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement. Id. at 2486. This exception is well-established, yet the Court
ruled against the government and decided to distinguish the petitioners case
due to the pure volume of information contained in a cell phone, as compared
to the typical level of intrusiveness of a search under this exception. Id. 2494
95. This reasoning should also apply to third-party doctrine. Even if this is a
well-established doctrine, the use of mass surveillance allows for potential
courts to distinguish from traditional third-party cases.
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Courts reasoning for finding a search has occurred is that this
level of intrusion becomes categorically different because
[m]ost people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have
received for the past several months, every picture they have
taken, or every book or article they have readnor would they
have any reason to attempt to do so.159
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alitos
concurrences also warn against falsely analogizing between
past technologies and present, advancing ones.160 As mentioned
above, Justice Sotomayors concurrence questions whether
third-party doctrine needs to be reworked in the light of
modern technology.161 Justice Alitos concurrence expressly
references mosaic theory by noting that the continued
surveillance of the appellant, for twenty-eight days, created an
unreasonable search.162 Both of these concurrences make use of
mosaic theory, but do not address the issues associated with
the theory.163 Those problems are solved by partial search
theory.
Another decision favorable to partial search theory comes
from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, not the United States
Supreme Court. In Maynard, the court decided that the
discrete, incomplete searches by the government accumulate
into a constitutionally protected search.164 In doing so, the
court adopted mosaic theory.165 The Eleventh Circuit also
alluded to the need to rethink third-party doctrine, and
possibly adopt mosaic theory.166 Two other federal district
courts have alluded to the possible need for mosaic theory in
159. Id. at 2489.
160. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); Id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 95758 (Alito, J., concurring).
163. See, e.g., id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
164. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 56162 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
affd in part sub nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
165. Id. at 562.
166. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.) (determining that
one cell phone data point can reveal private information), vacated and en banc
rehg granted, No. 12-12928, 2014 WL 4358411 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (Davis
has been vacated as it awaits rehearing en banc).
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light of modern technologies, albeit not in the context of NSA
surveillance.167
Computer science expert, Edward Felten, also highlights
the dangers of metadata collection through his declaration in
ACLU v. Clapper.168 Metadata can disclose records of
individual calls, a callers records maintained over time, and an
aggregation of various callers records kept over time.169 When
discussing individual calls, metadata is often a proxy for
content.170 These records have the potential to disclose highly
sensitive information or information denoting
associationalties.171 Collection of a callers records over time
also allows insight into their private life, associations, and
relationships.172 Further, aggregate records over time allow the
government to reach factual conclusions about an individuals
actions that other records would not illustrate.173
In addition to the explicit reasoning and holdings from
various court decisions, partial search theory is founded in a
broader, more general principle. The law must adapt in order
to protect citizens from arbitrary, unjustified, and unlawful
intrusions into their privacy.174 The framers of the Constitution
167. See United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 62024 (E.D. Mich.
2014) (finding that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his whereabouts over the course of the 30 day investigation because of the
accumulation of small intrusions, but ultimately denying Defendants motion
to suppress evidence because the officers acted in good-faith reliance on their
warrant, thus not triggering the exclusionary rule); United States v. Vargas,
No. CR-13-6025-EFS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, *13 (E.D. Wash. Dec.
15, 2014) (granting motion to suppress video evidence from a camera installed
without a warrant 100 yards away from the defendants home that displayed
the defendants front lawn continuously for six weeks, on grounds that the
surveillance constituted an unreasonable search).
168. Declaration of Professor Edward W. Felten, Am. Civil Liberties Union
v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 Civ. 3994), ECF No.
27, http://ia801803.us.archive.org/22/items/gov.uscourts.nysd.413072
/gov.uscourts.nysd.413072.27.0.pdf [Hereinafter Felten].
169. Id. at 1314.
170. Id. at 14.
171. Id. at 1516. These concerns with association, specifically political
associations, parallel the thesis of Professor Desai. See generally Desai, supra
note 130, passim (arguing that mass surveillance chills associational freedom).
172. Felten, supra note 168, at 17.
173. Id. at 2122.
174. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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realized that times would change and that the interpretation of
the Constitution would need to adapt to match the times.175
Extensive technologies that allow for the mass surveillance of
every U.S. citizen and advances in popular technology, through
things such as smart phones, were not the subject of the Fourth
Amendment when it was drafted. As a result, the Constitution,
and the doctrines used to decide constitutional cases, must be
re-evaluated to protect the publics rights. Mosaic theory is an
attempt to afford this protection, but even it has its issues.176
Partial search theory realizes the evolving nature of
technology, the stagnancy of the law, and creates a theory,
through comparison to intrusiveness of a search and the Katz
test, which limits the amorphous nature of the mosaic theory.
The United States Supreme Court has issued various
opinions that support that creation of partial-search theory.177
Jones and Riley illustrate the reluctance to use third-party
doctrine under modern conditions,178 while Katz relates the
partial search theory back to the doctrinal foundation of the
reasonable expectations of privacy test.179 While acting as
explicit legal support for this theory, these cases also illustrate
the more general principle that the United States Constitution,
specifically the Fourth Amendment, was drafted in a time far
removed from the modern technological amenities.180 As the
framers likely did not foresee the extent of government
surveillance, even if said surveillance is justified, mass
surveillance requires rethinking Fourth Amendment analysis.
Similarly, the framers did not foresee things such as smart
phones, which allow for large amounts of information
pertaining to ones life to be held in a single location, out of the
home, and able to be accessed by the government.
175. E.g., MCulloch v. State, 17 U.S. 316, 40607 (1819).
176. See supra Section II.B.1 (discussing issues with mosaic theory).
177. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); Jones, 132 S. Ct.
at 954 (2012); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); MCulloch, 17 U.S.
at 407.
178. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 95657 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
179. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the
reasonable expectations test).
180. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (the court analyzed the search
warrant requirement for modern cell phones [a]bsent . . . precise guidance
from the founding era).
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3. Application of partial search theory
The creation of partial search theory, in conjunction with
mosaic theory, has huge ramifications for government
surveillance, and for Fourth Amendment analysis generally.181
It can be assumed that, since the NSA collects so many
different types of information from people, the number of
pieces, notwithstanding the probative weight of any piece of
information, will lead to the NSAs warrantless surveillance
programs being unconstitutional.182 In order to avoid
suppression, the government must either enact safeguards so
that the level of intrusiveness reached by surveillance
programs does not reach the level in Katz or get an
individualized warrant for the surveillance of individuals.
Partial search theory does not completely distort Fourth
Amendment analysis, but at the same time allows courts to
adjust to the tactics the federal government has used to
circumvent the Fourth Amendment. While still allowing the
government to search those it suspects of committing serious
crimes, especially terrorism, partial search theory protects the
civil liberties of the American populace and requires the
government to take steps to protect the privacy of its citizens
rather than arbitrarily and unnecessarily trample on their
rights.183 Most importantly, partial search theory allows the
Fourth Amendment, third-party doctrine, and mosaic theory to
adjust to advancing technologies.184 While there are other
181. This is due to the extensive amount of data captured by the agency. In
2010, the Washington Post estimated that the NSA collected 1.7 billion
communications. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing
Beyond Control, WASH. POST (July 19, 2010),
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-
growing-beyond-control.
182. Cf. Gentithes, supra 9, at 38 (More plausibly, mosaic theorys
supporters might claim that there is a collective Fourth Amendment interest
shared by a group as large as all citizens using telecom services, one that is
infringed by a program as broad as the NSAs. That collective interest is not
based upon privacy, but is instead derived from the ideal of tranquility woven
into the structure of the Constitution and implicit in Justice Brandeiss
expression of the Fourth Amendments primary goalto protect citizens right
to be let alone. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Kayyali, supra note 58.
183. Cf. Steele, supra note 2 (outlining the vastness of the information
collected by the NSA); Kayyali, surpa note 58.
184. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); United States v.
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 56263 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the need to adopt
mosaic theory in light on modern technology), affd in part sub nom.
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issues, which still persist even in the presence of partial search
theory, this theory realizes that accumulated information can
reach the level of a search, and that the populous has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in these highly descriptive
bits of information.185 The population may assume that
government surveillance only affects the criminal, and thus the
issue is not of concern, but this thinking is misguided and
dangerous, as, when analyzing modern surveillance, every
person is the victim, for the technology we exalt today is
everymans master.186
The passage of the USA Freedom Act offers a unique
perspective to the future of third-party doctrine and mosaic
theory, as it offers more protections for citizens than the
Patriot Act did.187 However, these protections are statutory
only, not constitutional.188 Legislative measures may in fact be
the proper way to address surveillance, and raise[s] the
possibility that the third party doctrine should simply be left
alone.189 Third party doctrine is flawed, as highlighted by
Justice Sotomayor in Jones,190 and because of this imperfection,
legislatures, rather than courts, may be the proper agents to
calibrate law enforcement needs with privacy concerns.191
Legislative solutions allow for the more flexibility than
constitutional safeguards, and the tradeoff between privacy
and security is arguably better suited to be determined by the
democratic process.192 Additionally, Orin Kerr argues that since
the Fourth Amendment typically offers all or nothing
protections, legislative solutions allow for a middle ground not
possible under the Fourth Amendment.193
185. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945; Maynard, 615 F.3d at 56263.
186. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 757 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
187. See Chappell, supra note 4.
188. See Lucas Issacharoff & Kyle Wirshba, Restoring Reason to the Third
Party Doctrine, 100 MINN. L. REV. 985, 996 (2016).
189. Id.
190. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
191. Issacharoff & Wirshba, supra note 188, at 996 (noting the use of
legislative protections such as the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Pen
Register Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986).
192. See id.
193. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L.
REV. 561, 597 (2009).
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Certain differences between the Freedom Act and Patriot
Act may alleviate privacy concerns. Specifically, the Freedom
Act requires reasonable, articulable suspicion that a specific
selection term used to request telephone data is associated
with terrorism before a FISC order is granted.194 However, as
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
accumulation of metadata,195 probable cause is required to
avoid a Fourth Amendment violation,196 not simply reasonable
suspicion. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen how the newly
fashioned, legislative protections of the USA Freedom Act will
operate in practice, due mainly to the acts infancy.
4. How can non-searches become a search?
The issue of where an accumulation of non-searches
becomes a search also requires examining how a non-entity,
namely a non-search, can become an entity, namely a search.197
However, the response to this becomes clear by following the
analysis of the proceeding section. It is inaccurate to
characterize NSAs intrusions as non-searches, instead they are
partial searches that in isolation do not warrant constitutional
protections, but once added together do reach the level of a
search.198 If the intrusions are characterized in this manner,
the logical impossibility of non-searches becoming a search is
no longer present and the second chronicled issue with mosaic
theory disappears.
III. CONCLUSION
With the advantages of modern technology come new
challenges to individual privacy. The governments capacity to
surveil individuals, as well as the ability of citizens to store
their entire lives in electronic devices, has created a perfect
storm for substantial government surveillance. After Edward
194. USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 101, 129 Stat. at
270 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2015)).
195. See See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2942 (D.D.C. 2013).
Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), affd in part sub
nom. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945.
196. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 36061 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
197. See Gentithes, supra note 9, at 37.
198. Cf. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 56263, affd in part
sub nom.
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Snowdens disclosure of the extent of the NSAs surveillance,
the American people have become more aware, and arguably
less accepting, towards government surveillance.199 One aspect
of these realizations, which received extra attention, was the
metadata collection program taken part in by the NSA. The
attention this program drew was largely due to the amount of
information it collects.
Each piece of information captured by the government is
wrongly characterized as a non-search by third-party and
mosaic theorists. Instead, they are partial searcheseach not
deserving Fourth Amendment safeguards in isolation.
However, each of these partial searches, when added together,
eventually reach the level of intrusiveness of a search, as
viewed through the reasonable expectations of privacy test put
forth in Katz.200 Thus, at this point a warrant is required. So,
the government must put in place safeguards to keep the level
of intrusiveness below that point, or get a warrant in fear of
suppressing all the information it has gathered.
This analysis also responds to the second critique of mosaic
theory, as the intrusions should not be categorized as non-
searches, but as partial searches that accumulate into a search.
Government surveillance and modern technology offer new
challenges to traditional Fourth Amendment analysis. Mosaic
theory attempts to remedy these issues, but brings issues of its
own. However, characterizing third-party data collection as
partial searches, rather than non-searches addresses those
issues, does not result in total upheaval of the third-party
doctrine, and promotes new oversight into government
surveillance.
199. See Gao, supra note 1.
200. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 36061 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
***
